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Abstract
In this paper we consider a class of economies with a nite number of divisible commodities,
linear production technologies, and indivisible goods, and a nite number of agents. This
class contains several well-known economies with indivisible goods and money as special
cases. It is shown that if the utility functions are continuous on the divisible commodities
and are weakly monotonic both on one of the divisible commodities and on all the indi-
visible commodities, if each agent initially owns a sucient amount of one of the divisible
commodities, and if a \no-production-without-input"-like assumption on production sector
holds, then there exists a competitive equilibrium for any economy in this class. The usual
convexity assumption is not needed here. Furthermore, by imposing strong monotonicity
on one of the divisible commodities we show that any competitive equilibrium is in the core
of the economy and therefore the rst theorem of welfare also holds. We further obtain a
second welfare theorem stating that under some condtions a Pareto ecient allocation can
be sustained by a competitive equilibrium allocation for some well-chosen redistribution of
the total initial endowments.
Key words: indivisible commodities, divisible commodities, linear production, competitive
equilibrium, equilibrium theorem, welfare theorem
JEL-code: D2, D4, D5, D6.
1 Introduction
Since Industrial Revolution, indivisible commodities have constituted a prominently im-
portant part of commercial commodities in most of the markets. Typical indivisible com-
modities are, to name a few, houses, cars, employees, airplanes, ships, trains, computers,
machinery, and arts. Those goods are generally durable and expensive. Nowadays, even
many divisible commodities are sold in indivisible quantities such as oil being sold in barrel
as its smallest unit. Obviously, modelling economies in indivisibilities is more meaningful
and realistic. However, due to the extreme nonconvexity, studying such economies stands
in general a daunting challenge; see for example Koopmans and Beckman [8], Debreu [3],
and Scarf [13, 14, 15]. In spite of the diculties, we have seen a reviving interest in studying
economies with indivisibilities in recent years. The models in Bikhchandani and Mamer [2],
van der Laan, Talman and Yang [9], Ma [10], Bevia, Quinzii and Silva [1], and Yang [18]
in one way or another generalize those in Shapley and Scarf [12], Kelso and Crawford [7],
Quinzii [11], Gale [4], Kaneko and Yamamoto [6], and Yamamoto [16] from economies with
one indivisible commodity and money to economies with multiple indivisible commodities
and money.
In this paper we consider an exchange economy with a nite number of divisible
commodities, linear production technologies, and indivisible goods, and a nite number
of agents. In contrast, in the existing models above money was assumed to be the only
divisible good and no production was involved. In our model, it is assumed that each
agent initially owns one indivisible object and a certain amount of one of the divisible
commodities, say, commodity zero, and that each agent can demand any amount of each
of the divisible commodities but demands at most one indivisible object. Commodity zero is
served as labour or capital and is used as input to produce the other divisible commodities.
It is shown that if the utility functions are weakly monotonic on both commodity zero and
the indivisible commodities, and are continuous on the divisible commodities, and if each
agent initially owns in some sense a \sucient" amount of commodity zero, then there
exists a competitive equilibrium in the economy. The usual convexity assumption is not
required here. Furthermore, by imposing strong monotonicity of the utility on commodity
zero we show that any competitive equilibrium is in the core of the economy and therefore
the rst theorem of welfare holds. We also obtain the second welfare theorem stating that
any Pareto ecient allocation satisfying some condition can be sustained by a competitive
equilibrium allocation for some well-chosen redistribution of the total initial endowments.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 the economic model and its
conditions for the existence of equilibrium are introduced. In Section 3 we prove the




Let Ik = f1; : : : ; kg be the set of the rst k positive integers. For k 2 IN, IR
k denotes the
k-dimensional Euclidean space and IRk+ its nonnegative orthant. For i 2 Ik, e(i) denotes
the i-th k-dimensional unit vector. The vectors 0k and 1k denote the k-dimensional vectors
of zeros and ones, respectively, and Ek = f0k; e(1); : : : ; e(k)g is the set of all k-dimensional
unit vectors and the k-dimensional vector of zeros.
We consider an exchange economy with m agents, n + 1 divisible commodities, m
indivisible objects, and a production sector. The divisible commodities are indexed by
j = 0; 1; : : : ; n. Each agent i, i 2 Im, initially owns one indivisible object denoted by
object i, and a certain positive amount !i0 of commodity zero. In the following, for agent
i 2 Im, his bundle of initial endowments is denoted by the pair (!
i; e(i)) where !i 2 IRn+1+
with !ij = 0 for j = 1; : : : ; n, denotes his initial endowment of the divisibilities and the unit
vector e(i) denotes his initial endowment of the indivisibilities, meaning that agent i only
owns object i. Commodity zero can be interpreted as labour or capital. A consumption
bundle of agent i is given by the pair (xi; `i) 2 IRn+1+  E
m, where the vector xi denotes
his consumption of the divisibilities and the vector `i his consumption of the indivisible
objects. Note that either `i is equal to 0m in which case agent i does not consume any
object, or for some j 2 Im it holds that `
i = e(j), indicating that agent i consumes the
object initially owned by agent j. The preferences of agent i 2 Im are represented by a
utility function ui: IRn+1+  E
m ! IR. This means that the agent derives utility from at
most one indivisible object.
The production sector of the economy is specied by n linear production tech-
nologies. Production technology j, j 2 In, is represented by a vector a
j 2 IRn+1. Let
A = [a1; : : : ; an] denote the (n + 1)  n matrix of input-output vectors of the divisible
goods, let the row vector A0 denote the rst row of A, and let bA denote the n n matrix
obtained by deleting the rst row from A. Production only concerns the divisibilities. The
production levels are denoted by y 2 IRn+, i.e. yj  0 is the level of production of produc-
tion activity j 2 In. For given vector y of production levels, the vector of total inputs and
outputs is given by Ay.
We denote an economy as specied above by E = f(!i; e(i); ui)i2Im ; Ag. The prices
of the divisible commodities are denoted by the vector p = (p0; p1; : : : ; pn)
> 2 IRn+1+ nf0
n+1g
and the prices of the indivisibilities by the vector q = (q1; : : : ; qm)
> 2 IRm+ . For the pair
(p; q) of price vectors, the budget set Bi(p; q) of agent i is the set of consumption bundles
given by
Bi(p; q) = f(xi; `i) 2 IRn+1+  E




All agents are assumed to be utility maximizing agents. So given (p; q), agent i maximizes
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utility over his budget set, yielding the demand set Di(p; q) given by




A competitive equilibrium in the economy E = f(!i; e(i); ui)i2Im; Ag is a pair (p
; q)
of price vectors, a vector y of production levels, and a collection (xi; `i), i 2 Im, of
consumption bundles, satisfying
(i) (xi; `i) 2 Di(p; q) for all i 2 Im;












The rst condition states that in equilibrium each agents maximizes his utility given his
budget constraint at the equilibrium prices. Condition (ii) states that no production tech-
nology can make a positive prot, all activity levels are not negative and that for any
technology the prot is zero if the activity level is positive. The last two conditions clear
the markets of the indivisible and divisible commodities, respectively. Observe that in
equilibrium the vector Ay of inputs and outputs equals the dierence between the agents'
total demand and supply for the divisible commodities.
With respect to the economy E the following assumptions are made.
A1. The activity matrix A satises that A0 is a strictly negative row vector, bA is a regular
n n matrix and bA 1 is nonnegative.
A2. For every agent i 2 Im the utility function u
i is weakly monotonic in commodity zero
and in the indivisible goods.
A3. For every agent i 2 Im the utility function u
i(; `) is continuous for each given ` 2 Em.
A4. For every agent i 2 Im, there exist some x
i 2 IRn+1+ and some y 2 IR
n
+ such that
xi = Ay + !i and
ui(xi; e(i)) > max
j2Im
ui(0n+1; e(j)):
The rst statement in Assumption A1 implies that capital or labour is needed
as input for any production technology. So, there can be no production without input,
that is Ay  0 and y  0 imply y = 0. Note that any Leontief input-output matrix
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satises the second statement of Assumption A1. This part of the assumption implies
that any demand for the commodities 1; : : : ; n, denoted by a nonnegative (nonzero) vector
x
 0 = (x1; : : : ; xn)
>, can be produced, i.e. there exists a nonnegative vector y 2 IRn+
of activities levels such that bAy = x
 0, namely y = bA 1x 0. Observe that this allows
that a divisible commodity other than commodity zero is an output in some activities
and serves as an input in others and therefore can be both an intermediate commodity in
the production sector and a nal commodity in the consumption sector. Assumptions A2
and A3 are weaker than the standard conditions in the Arrow-Debreu framework. Weak
monotonicity of the utility function is only required for commodity zero and the indivisible
objects. The latter means that having any object is weakly preferred to having no object.
Assumption A4 says that every agent's initial endowment of commodity zero is enough to
produce a vector x of divisible commodities such that the pair (x; e(i)) is strictly preferred
to any indivisible object without divisible commodities. Together with Assumption A1 this
implicitly assumes that !i0 > 0 for all i. Of course, Assumption A4 holds if the stronger
condition maxj2Im u
i(0n+1; e(j)) < ui(!i; e(i)) holds, i.e. if the initial endowment itself is
strictly preferred to any indivisible object without divisible goods. Finally, notice that we
do not make any convexity assumption on the preferences, and that some of the divisible
commodities j = 1,   , n, could be divisible bads.
3 Existence of Equilibrium
In this section we prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium the economy. To do so,
we rst prove two lemmas.
Lemma 3.1
Let the activity matrix A satisfy A1. Then there is a unique strictly positive price vector
p, such that p0 = 1 and p
>A = 0n.
Proof.














Take p0 = 1. Then the system becomes
p>
 0
bA =  A>0 ;
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where p
 0 = (p1; : : : ; pn)
>. From the rst part of A1 we know that the n vector A>0 2 IR
n
++
and from the second part that bA 1 exists and is nonnegative. Hence the latter system of
equations has a unique strictly positive solution equal to   bA 1A>0 . Q.E.D.
In the remaining of this paper p stands for the unique strictly positive price vector satis-
fying the conditions of Lemma 3.1, so p>A = 0n and p0 = 1. In the next lemma we show
that at p each agent's demand correspondence is upper semi-continuous in the prices of
the indivisibilities.
Lemma 3.2
Let the economy E = f(!i; e(i); ui)i2Im; Ag satisfy Assumptions A1, A3 and A4. Then,
for every agent i 2 Im, the correspondence D
i(p; ) is upper semi-continuous (u.s.c) in
q 2 IRm+ .
Proof.
Let q be an arbitrary price vector in IRm+ and i 2 Im an arbitrarily taken agent. Take any
sequence fqkgk2IN in IR
m
+ converging to q and sequence f(x
k; `k)gk2IN converging to (x; `)
with (xk; `k) 2 Di(p; qk) for all k 2 IN. We have to show that (x; `) 2 Di(p; q). Without
loss of generality we can assume that `k = ` for all k 2 IN, for Em is a nite set. Since, for
all k 2 IN,
p>xk + qk>`  p>!i + qk>e(i);
we have that
p>x+ q>`  p>!i + q>e(i);
i.e. (x; `) lies in Bi(p; q). Now, suppose (x; `) 62 Di(p; q). Then there exists (x; ̀) 2
Di(p; q) such that
ui(x; ̀) > ui(x; `) (1)
and
p>x+ q> ̀ p>!i + q>e(i): (2)
We will prove that x 6= 0n+1. Suppose that x = 0n+1. Then from Assumption A4 it follows
that there exists a vector ex such that
ui(x; ̀) < ui(ex; e(i))
and
ex = Aey + !i
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for some ey 2 IRn+. From the last equation we obtain
p>ex = p>Aey + p>!i = p>!i;
and so (ex; e(i)) 2 Bi(p; q). This contradicts (x; ̀) 2 Di(p; q) and therefore we must have
that x 6= 0n+1. With Assumption A3 and from equations (1) and (2) it now follows that
there exists " > 0 such that ex = (1   ")x 2 IRn+1+ satises
ui(ex; ̀) > ui(x; `) (3)
and
p>ex+ q> ̀< p>!i + q>e(i):
From the latter inequality it follows that for k large enough it holds that
p>ex+ qk> ̀< p>!i + qk>e(i) (4)
and from A3 and inequality (3) it follows that for k large enough
ui(ex; ̀) > ui(xk; `): (5)
Together the inequalities (4) and (5) contradict (xk; l) 2 Di(p; qk) for k large enough.
Hence we must have that (x; l) 2 Di(p; q) and so Di(p; ) is upper semi-continuous.
Q.E.D.
We are now ready to state the main equilibrium existence theorem.
Theorem 3.3
Let the economy E = f(!i; e(i); ui)i2Im; Ag satisfy Assumptions A1-A4. Then there exists
a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. First, for some real number M >
P
i2Im
!i0, dene the m-dimensional set U
M by
UM = fq 2 IRm+ j qj M for all j 2 Img:
From Lemma 3.2 we have that for each agent i the demand correspondence Di(p; ) is u.s.c
on UM . For i 2 Im, dene D
i
ind(p
; q) as the demand set restricted to the indivisibilities,
i.e.
Diind(p
; q) = f` 2 Em j (x; `) 2 Di(p; q) for some x 2 IRn+1+ g:
Further, dene fDind(p; q) as the sum of the convex hulls of these sets, i.e.





where Conv() denotes the convex hull. Next, let Z(p; q) be dened by
Z(p; q) = fDind(p; q)  f1mg:
Clearly, the correspondence Z(p; ) is convex, compact and non-empty valued and upper
semi-continuous at any q 2 UM . From Yang [17] it follows that there exist an m-vector
q 2 UM and an m-vector è2 fDind(p; q) such that è satises the conditions
`j   1  0 if q

j = 0;
`j   1 = 0 if 0 < q

j < M;
`j   1  0 if q

j = M:
Consequently, there exists a tuple f è1; : : : ; èmg of m-dimensional vectors withèi 2 Conv(Diind(p; q)) for all i 2 Im and Pi2Im èi = è, that satises the conditionsPm
i=1 `
i














For i; j 2 Im, let c
i be the vector in IRm+ dened by




cij = 0 otherwise:
(7)
Since for all i 2 Im it holds that èi 2 Conv(Diind(p; q)), it follows that the collection
f è1; : : : ; èmg also satises the conditionsPm
j=1 `
i





j  1 otherwise;
0  `ij  c
i
j for all i; j 2 Im:
(8)
From Homan and Kruskal [5] we know that the set of m2 variables `ij satisfying the
(in)equalities given in (6) and (8) has an integral solution. Let the collection f b̀1; : : : ; b̀mg
denote such an integral solution. From the conditions given in (8) it follows that for every
i the vector b̀i contains at most one component equal to one. Suppose that b̀ij = 1 for some
j 2 Im. Then it follows from the rst and third restrictions in (8) and from the denition
of cij in (7) that e(j) 2 D
i
ind(p
; q) and hence b̀i = e(j) 2 Diind(p; q). Now, suppose thatb̀i = 0m. Then it follows from the rst two restrictions in (8) that 0m 2 Diind(p; q) and
hence b̀i 2 Diind(p; q). So, for all i 2 Im we have that b̀i 2 Diind(p; q).
We next show that the collection f b̀1; : : : ; b̀mg satises Pi2im b̀i  1m. Dene
















We will show that J3 = ;. For i 2 Im, let bxi be a vector of divisible goods such that
(bx; b̀i) 2 Di(p; q)). Recall that b̀i 2 Diind(p; q) and hence such a vector bxi exists. From
the budget constraint it follows that
p>bxi + q> b̀i  p>!i + q>e(i) = !i0 + q>e(i); i 2 Im:
Adding up over all i 2 Im we obtain
mX
i=1
p> bxi + mX
i=1









p> bxi + mX
i=1
q>
b̀i   e(i)  mX
i=1
!i0:





j = 1 =
Pm
i=1 ej(i) if j 2 J







































1 for all j 2 Im.




j = 0. First
notice that the collection f b̀1; : : : ; b̀mg assigns the indivisible goods j 2 J2 to jJ2j dierent
agents, leaving the other m jJ2j = jJ1j agents without any object. Furthermore it follows
from the rst condition in (6) that qj = 0 if j 2 J
1. Since by Assumption A2 the utility
functions are weakly monotonic in the indivisible goods it therefore must hold that
ui(bxi; e(j)) = ui(bxi; 0m) if j 2 J1 and b̀i = 0m;
and therefore
(bxi; e(j)) 2 Di(p; q) if j 2 J1 and b̀i = 0m:
From this it follows that the indivisible goods in J1 can be assigned to the agents i for
which b̀i = 0m by any arbitrarily chosen one to one assignment. Let i(j) be the agent in
the set I0 = fi 2 Im j b̀i = 0mg who has been assigned object j 2 J1 in this way. Then we
dene the collection f`1; : : : ; `mg by
`i = b̀i if i 62 I0;
`i(j) = e(j) if i(j) 2 I0:
8




and so all markets of the indivisible goods clear.
We nally dene a collection fx1; : : : ; xmg of (n + 1)-vectors of divisible goods.
When for i 2 Im the budget restriction
p>bxi + q>`i  p>!i + q>e(i)
holds with equality we dene xi = bxi. When the budget restriction holds with inequality
we dene xij = bxij for all j 2 In and xi0 > bxi0 such that
p>xi + q>`i = p>!i + q>e(i): (9)
From the weak monotonicity assumption with respect to good 0 (Assumption A2) it follows




















since we already showed that the markets of the indivisibilities clear. We now dene the
















+ it follows from Assumption A1 that
y 2 IRn+. Hence y
 is a feasible vector of the production activity levels. From equation








Since equation (11) implies that x
 0 =
bAy and hence all markets j 2 In are in equilibrium,
it follows from equation (12) that also the market of commodity 0 is in equilibrium. This
proves that the tuple fp; q; y; (xi; `i)i2Img is a competitive equilibrium. Q.E.D.
If we apply the methods described in Yang [17], we can actually compute a com-
petitive equilibrium in the economy. This is quite desirable in practice. It should be also
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observed that there are probably multiple integer solutions to the systems of (in)equalities
(6) and (8). Any solution results in a distribution of the indivisible commodities over the
agents. Two dierent equilibrium distributions induced by two of such integer solutions
may result in dierent corresponding excess demand vectors for the divisibilities. Never-
theless the conditions on the model guarantee that any total demand for the divisibilities at
such an equilibrium distribution of the indivisibilities can be produced by the production
sector.
4 Welfare Theorems
In this section we analyse the welfare properties of the competitive equilibria for the econ-
omy E = f(!i; e(i); ui)i2Im; Ag. First we give the denitions of a feasible allocation and
Pareto eciency. Given any x1; : : : ; xm 2 IRn+1+ and `
1; : : : ; `m 2 Em, we call the m-tuple
(x; `) = ((x1; `1); : : : ; (xm; `m)) of pairs an allocation. We rst give the denitions of a
feasible allocation and a Pareto ecient allocation.
Denition 4.1




i = Ay +
Pm
i=1 !





The denition says that an allocation is feasible if it induces a redistribution of the indi-
visibilities and if the excess demand vector can be produced by the production sector.
Denition 4.2
An allocation (x; `) is Pareto ecient if it is feasible and there does not exist a feasible
allocation (x0; `0) such that
(i) ui(x0i; `0i)  ui(xi; `i) for all i 2 Im,
(ii) ui(x0i; `0i) > ui(xi; `i) for at least one i 2 Im.
Because in Assumption A2 we only require weak monotonicity, in general a competitive
equilibrium allocation can not be guaranteed to be Pareto ecient according to Denition
4.2. To assure this we could use the weaker requirement that (x; `) is said to be Pareto
ecient if there does not exist a feasible allocation (x0; `0) such that ui(x0i; `0i) > ui(xi; `i)
for all i 2 Im. Instead of doing this, in this section we replace Assumption A2 by a slightly
stronger assumption:
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A'2. For every agent i 2 Im the utility function u
i is strongly monotonic in commodity
zero and weakly monotonic in the indivisible goods.
To show that the competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto ecient we will prove that
this allocation is in the core of the economy. We therefore rst give a denition of the core.
Then we show that the core of the economy is non-empty by proving that any competitive
equilibrium allocation with the price vector p for the divisible commodities lies in the core
and therefore is also Pareto ecient. To give a denition of the core, we rst state the
concept of the domination of an allocation.
Denition 4.3
A subset S of the set Im of agents is able to dominate an allocation (x; `) if there exists an




0i = Ay0 +
P
i2S !







(iii) ui(x0i; `0i)  ui(xi; `i) for all i 2 S and ui(x0i; `0i) > ui(xi; `i) for some i 2 S.
An allocation (x; `) is said to be dominated if there is an S  Im of agents that is able to
dominate (x; `).
If a subset S of agents is able to dominate the allocation (x; `) then they are able to
improve on (x; `), i.e. making at least one of them better o and all others at least equally
well, by utilizing the production structure for production of divisibilities out of their own
resources of commodity 0 and trading among themselves the indivisibilities. So, we allow
any coalition to make use of the full production possibilities, i.e. the production activities
are non-excludable. This is reasonable given the constant-returns-to-scale structure of the
production sector.
Denition 4.4
An allocation (x; `) is in the core of the economy E = f(!i; e(i); ui)i2Im; Ag if it is feasible
and there does not exist a subset S of Im that is able to dominate (x; `).
Theorem 4.5
Let the economy E = f(!i; e(i); ui)i2Im; Ag satisfy Assumptions A1 and A'2 and let
(x; `) be a competitive equilibrium allocation with p as its equilibrium prices of divisible
commodities. Then (x; `) is a core allocation.
Proof. Let (p; q) be the corresponding competitive price system with respect to (x; `).
From Lemma 3.1, we have p>A = 0n. Suppose that (x; `) is not in the core. Then there





i = Ay +
P
i2S !







(iii) ui(xi; `i)  ui(xi; `i) for all i 2 S and ui(xi; `i) > ui(xii; `i) for some i 2 S.
From the utility maximization behavior it follows that (xi; `i) 62 Bi(p; q) for all i 2 S
with ui(xi; `i) > ui(xi; `i), i.e.
p>xi + q>`i > p>!i + q>e(i):
Because of the strong monotonicity (Assumption A'2) with respect to commodity zero it
must hold that for every agent i 2 S with ui(xi; `i) = ui(xi; `i),
p>xi + q>`i  p>!i + q>e(i):

































because p>Ay = 0. Hence a contradiction has been obtained. Q.E.D.
We now have the following core allocation existence theorem.
Theorem 4.6
Let the economy E = f(!i; e(i); ui)i2Im ; Ag satisfy Assumptions A1, A'2, A3 and A4.
Then the core is not empty.
Proof.
In the proof of Theorem 3.3 we have shown that there exists a competitive equilbri-
um (p; q; y; (xi; `i)i2Im) with p
 the unique strictly positive price vector satisfying
p>A = 0n. From Theorem 4.5 it follows that the allocation (x; `) lies in the core.
So, the core is not empty. Q.E.D.
Clearly, an allocation in the core is Pareto ecient, because no coalition is able to dominate
a core allocation and hence neither is the grand coalition of agents Im. So, a core allocation
satises Denition 4.2 of Pareto eciency. This gives us immediately the First Theorem
of Welfare, stated in the next theorem.
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Theorem 4.7
Let the economy E = f(!i; e(i); ui)i2Im; Ag satisfy Assumptions A1 and A'2 and let
(x; `) be a competitive equilibrium allocation with p as its equilibrium prices of divisible
commodities. Then (x; `) is Pareto ecient.
Finally we prove that under some conditions also the Second Theorem of Welfare holds
by using the existence result of Section 3. This approach oers us a simple proof of the
second welfare theorem. We rst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.8
Let (bx; b̀) be a feasble allocation for the economy E = f(!i; e(i); ui)i2Im; Ag. Then the
allocation (b!; b̀) dened by b!i = (p> bxi; 0; : : : ; 0)>, i 2 Im, is a redistribution of the initial
endowments (!i; e(i))i2Im.
Proof.
Since (bx; b̀) is a feasible allocation, it holds that
mX
i=1
b̀i = 1m (13)
and that there exists by 2 IRn+ such that
mX
i=1
bxi = Aby + mX
i=1
!i: (14)
Moreover, by the denition of p, we have that p>Aby = 0. So, premultiplying equation
(14) with p yields
mX
i=1












Together with equation (13) this shows that (b!i; b̀i)i2Im is a redistribution of the initial
endowments (!i; e(i))i2Im. Q.E.D.
By using Lemma 4.8, we will prove the second theorem of welfare next.
Theorem 4.9
Let the economy E = f(!i; e(i); ui)i2Im; Ag satisfy Assumptions A1-A3 and let (bx; b̀) be
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a Pareto ecient allocation such that for every i 2 Im, there exist some x
i 2 IRn+1+ and
some y 2 IRn+ satisfying x
i = Ay + b!i and
max
j2Im
ui(0n+1; e(j)) < ui(xi; b̀i)
where b!i = (p>bxi; 0; : : : ; 0)>. Then (bx; b̀) is a competitive equilibrium allocation for the
economy bE = f(b!i; b̀i; ui)i2Im ; Ag.
Proof. First of all, notice that bxi 6= 0n+1, otherwise the condition about the utilities can not
hold. The condition on the utilities implies that the economy bE satises Assumptions A1-
A4. From Theorem 3.3 it follows that bE has a competitive equilibrium (bp; bq; by; (bx; b̀))
satisfying




bxi = Aby +Pmi=1 b!i,





Since p> bxi = b!i0 = p> b!i, we obtain for all i 2 Im that
p>bxi + q> b̀i = p> b!i + q> b̀i;
and hence (bxi; b̀i) 2 Bi(p; bq). Then from (iii) it follows that
ui(bxi; b̀i)  ui(bxi; b̀i); i 2 Im: (15)
From Lemma 4.8 we have that the allocation (b!i; b̀i)i2Im is a redistribution of the initial
endowments (!i; e(i))i2Im. So, an allocation (x; `) is feasible for the economy
bE if and only
if it is feasible for the economy E. Clearly, this also holds for Pareto ecient allocations.
So, since (bx; b̀) is Pareto ecient for E it is also a Pareto ecient allocation for bE . Now,
suppose there exists an i 2 Im such that (15) holds with strict inequality. Then this
contradicts the Pareto eciency of (bx; b̀) for bE. So, for all i 2 Im we have equality in (15)
and hence (bxi; b̀i) 2 Di(p; bq) for all i 2 Im. Since (bx; b̀) is a feasible allocation for bE , there
exists by 2 IRn+ such that
mX
i=1
bxi = Aby + mX
i=1
b!i:
Since by denition of p, also p>A = 0n holds, it follows that (p; bq; by; (bx; b̀)) satises all
the equilibrium conditions of Denition 2.1 for the economy bE . Q.E.D.
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